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♦The first version of this paper was prepared at the request of the 
OECD and presented to an expert meeting in Paris on 
unemployment compensation in January, 1988. We are grateful 
to Stephen Jenkins, Peter Jensen, Joan Payne, Dennis Snower and 
seminal participants in Melbourne and Canberra for helpful 
comments on a later version. The usual disclaimer applies. A 
revision of this paper was undertaken while Micklewright was a 
visitor in the Department of Economics at the University of 
Melbourne in 1989; he thanks the Department for its hospitality 
and facilities.
The figures for the 5 percent sample of unemployed benefit 
claimants in Britain quoted in Section 2 are based on results from 
a project carried out by Micklewright.' . We are grateful to the 
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The paper critically reviews the treatment of unemployment 
compensation in both theoretical and empirical models of labour 
market transitions. The paper has two themes. The first is the 
need to consider the effect of unemployment benefits on 
transitions o ther than those betw een em ploym ent and 
unemployment. The second is the importance of taking account of 
the institu tional features of unem ploym ent com pensation 
schemes, in particular the distinction between contributory 
unemployment insurance (UI) and income-tested unemployment 
assistance (UA). The review of theory includes partial and general 
equilibrium job search models, contract models and efficiency 
wage and dual labour market theories. The treatm ent of 
unemployment compensation in theoretical models is frequently 
very crude, typically ignoring such features as contribution 
requirements for UI, means-testing under UA, and conditions 
regarding voluntary quitting, availability for work and search 
effort. Moreover, much of the literature deals with a two-state 
model, considering only movements between employment and 
unemployment. Empirical evidence from a number of OECD 
countries concerning the effect of unemployment compensation on 
a variety of labour market transitions is appraised, and the need 
for care when making international comparisons is stressed. In 
addition to surveying the effect of varying benefit levels, 
consideration is given to the impact of such features as benefit 
duration, administration, and method of finance. The richer view 
of unemployment compensation and the labour market taken in 
the paper allows some positive impacts on transitions to be 





























































































The marked rise in unemployment in most OECD countries during the 1970s 
and 1980s has led to unemployment compensation being given by both academic 
economists and policy makers an attention it had not previously received in 
the post-war period. This attention has largely been critical. Economists 
have typically seen unemployment compensation as having a negative effect 
on the labour market, with high benefits causing the unemployed to be less 
willing to accept jobs and inducing those in employment to quit to become 
unemployed. Rises in unemployment and persistent differences in the 
levels of unemployment between countries are attributed, at least in part, 
to more generous levels of benefit payments, or to extended periods of 
entitlement.
The negative view of unemployment compensation has tended to lead to a 
polarisation of the policy choices, with adequacy of benefit levels being 
traded-off against their disincentive effect in increasing unemployment at 
the expense of employment. A government has - on this approach - to choose 
between cutting benefit and discouraging work. But this is a dangerous 
over-simplification for at least two reasons. To begin with, it assumes 
that policy is. judged in terms solely of reducing unemployment and 
increasing employment. This takes a too limited view of the labour market. 
A central theme of the paper is that it is necessary to distinguish several 
different labour market states, and not just to consider employment and 
unemployment. People may leave the unemployment register but not take 
employment. They may leave the labour force or undertake full-time 
training or education. Employment cannot be regarded as homogeneous. A 
temporary job in the black economy is quite different from a career 
position with a large "blue chip" company. We begin therefore by providing 
in Section 1 a framework which allows for these features.
The second misleading feature of the trade-off view is that it 
mistakenly assumes that the impact of unemployment compensation can be 
summarised in terms of a single number. There is more to its operation 
than simply the level of benefit. We have also to take account of (among 
other aspects) the conditions which determine whether a person is 




























































































possibility of disqualification, the contribution conditions, the structure 
of benefit over time, the relationship between benefit and the income of 
other family members, and the financing of benefit schemes. The importance 
of the institutional features of unemployment compensation is the second 
principal theme of this paper. The form of unemployment benefit may have 
major implications for the predicted impact on employment, unemployment and 
wages. In particular, we must distinguish between unemployment insurance 
and unemployment assistance. These aspects are examined in Section 2, 
which reviews the theoretical treatment of unemployment compensation and 
some of the ways in which it affects labour market transitions, either 
directly or indirectly via changes in wages. We are especially concerned 
with the assumptions about how unemployment compensation operates and their 
implications for the conclusions drawn. We argue that, with some notable 
exceptions, theorists have paid little attention to how unemployment 
benefits actually work. In Section 3 we consider the empirical evidence 
concerning the effect of unemployment compensation on labour market 
transitions in the OECD area. We emphasise the need when interpreting the 
evidence to recognise that the unemployment compensation schemes actually 
in force in OECD countries may differ quite considerably, in particular 
with respect to the distinction between insurance and assistance.
Our review is of necessity selective in several important ways. First, 
a full discussion of the impact of unemployment compensation would need to 
consider its relationship to aspects of policy which we do not cover here, 
such as active measures to encourage employment or the impact of personal 
income taxation. Secondly, we do not seek to give an exhaustive account 
of the impact of unemployment compensation on the economy. Our emphasis is 
on the direct impact on labour market transitions. While we do consider 
the impact of unemployment compensation on wage setting in describing 
theoretical models, this does not feature in our account of the empirical 
evidence. We give no consideration to the impact of unemployment 
compensation on aggregate demand in its role as an automatic stabiliser. 
While we do emphasise some positive aspects of unemployment compensation, 
our aim is not to draw up a list of plus and minus points. Rather, it is 
to assess some of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence on which 




























































































Finally, in referring to theoretical and empirical studies we have made 
no attempt to be comprehensive; we try merely to highlight contributions 
which illustrate our ideas. Our selection also reflects the countries with 
which we are most familiar, and it cannot be stressed too strongly that 
findings for one country do not necessarily carry over to another with 
different history and institutions. This applies especially to the United 
States, which has the richest stock of empirical evidence, but whose labour 
market is different in crucial respects from that found in European 
countries, which differ in turn from Japan and other OECD countries. 
Within countries, too, labour market and other conditions change over time, 
and a more extended review of the evidence would need to account for the 




























































































1. LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
i) In and out of the labour force
The effect of unemployment insurance is typically seen in terms of the 
disincentive it provides to leave unemployment for employment, encouraging 
workers to search longer or less intensively for new employment. Or it 
provides an encouragement to make the reverse transition by quitting 
employment to enter unemployment. These are important transitions and we 
discuss in Section 3 the quantitative evidence as to how they are affected 
by unemployment compensation. However, this represents only a partial 
picture. For example, the relaxation of eligibility criteria for 
unemployment benefits may lead persons not previously participating to join 
the labour force, while disqualification or exhaustion of benefit 
entitlement may lead to withdrawal from the labour force rather than 
employment. We need therefore to consider flows between inactivity and 
unemployment. Similarly, we need to recognise that in most countries a 
person on a government training scheme is classified neither as employed 
nor as unemployed. Moreover, an unemployed person taken off the register 
by a training scheme may not, as is hoped, move into employment, but may 
exit back into unemployment.
A pre-requisite for our analysis is a model of the labour market with 
more than the two states employment and unemployment. We are not of course 
the first to argue for this. In the US, the case has been put forcefully 
by Clark and Summers (1979, 1982, 1982a). Their emphasis is on flows to 
and from the state "out of the labour force" which may be thought of as 
encompassing several different situations, including full-time education or 
training, sickness, military service and retirement. Using data from the 
US Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1974, Clark and Summers argue that 
almost one half of all completed spells of unemployment ended in withdrawal 
from the labour force and not in employment (1979, pp.16 and 25). 
(Although see Abowd and Zellner, 1985, and Hogue and Flaim, 1986, for 
discussion of problems of measuring flows with CPS data).
The existence of sizeable flows to and from economic inactivity is a 




























































































different definitions of the labour market states. Table 1 shows for eight 
OECD countries the labour market status in 1985 of persons in the 
unemployed stock 12 months previously. In seven of the eight countries, of 
those no longer unemployed a year later, more than one fifth were out of 
the labour force. (The exception is Italy). In Ireland and the UK the 
figure was over two fifths.
Table 1: Labour Force Status in 1985 of those Unemployed 12 Months Earlier
Unemployment Employment Not in ]
% % %
Belgium 69 22 9
Denmark 37 49 14
France 54 29 17
Ireland 69 18 13
Italy (1983) 61 32 7
Netherlands 62 24 14
UK 51 29 20
US 26 49 25
Source: All except the US from OECD, 1987, Table 1.12, based on recall 
information in the Labour Force Surveys; the US figure from OECD, 1987, 
Table 6.9, based on the Current Population Survey re-interviews.
For those no longer unemployed, the labour force state in 1985 was not 
necessarily that entered from the 1984 spell of unemployment. Moreover, 
some of those unemployed in 1985 would have had left for employment but 
re-entered unemployment during the year. Nevertheless, the table suggests 
strongly that large numbers of spells of unemployment end in exit to 
inactivity rather than employment. We should note also that the figures 
refer to the length-biased samples provided by the unemployment stock and 
to the extent that exit to inactivity is more common from long spells the 
figures in the table may give an exaggerated picture of the flows into 
inactivity. We would also expect the pictures for men and women to be 
rather different. Having said this, evidence from several countries 
indicate that flows into inactivity are also a prominent feature of data 
referring to men only and of data referring to a random sample of outflows. 
A survey of some 14,000 men officially registered as unemployed in the UK 




























































































register six months later had entered employment (UK Department of 
Employment Gazette, June 1977, p.565). In Canada, Hasan and de Broucker 
show 44 per cent of completed spells of unemployment recorded in Canadian 
data for 1980 ending in withdrawal from the labour force and even for males 
aged 25-44 the figure is 28 per cent (1984, p.47). Cramer and Werner find 
that only 67 per cent of outflows from West German unemployment in 
September 1977 for males aged 25 and over was to work (including job 
creation schemes) (1984, Table 5c). French data for 1975-1980 show that 
over a 6 month period some 55 per cent of unemployed men left for 
employment but 12 per cent withdrew from the labour force (Barge and 
Salais, 1984, Figure 9a).
The figures in Table 1 and those in the text relate to the transition 
from unemployment to inactivity, but the transitions out of inactivity are 
also important. Clark and Summers found that over two-thirds of persons 
entering employment in a given month were out of the labour force in the 
preceding month (1979, pp.16 and 25). Figures for eight European Community 
countries show that, of those in a permanent job in 1985 who had not been 
in employment a year earlier, more than half had been "not in the labour 
force" rather than "unemployed" (OECD, 1987, Table 1.11, based on recall 
information in the Labour Force Surveys).
The state "out of the labour force" covers, as noted above, a wide 
range of conditions and this has important implications for any discussion 
of labour market policy. As Clark and Summers admit, their results based 
on CPS data are strongly affected by the definitions of unemployment and 
"out of the labour force" used in the survey, these not precluding the 
classification of a person as inactive who was receiving unemployment 
benefit. We may distinguish between a definition of unemployment based on 
administrative considerations, such as the claiming or receipt of 
unemployment benefit, and one based on individual perception of 
circumstances or behaviour, such as a minimum level of job search activity. 
The 1982 ILO Guidelines for unemployment statistics, now used by the OECD, 
relate to the latter. However, in the UK, at least, the official measure of 
unemployment is based on the former. The implications of the distinction 
are illustrated by the fact that in the UK in 1987, although the total 




























































































cent of those classified as unemployed according to the benefit definition 
were so classified according to the ILO/OECD definition (Department of 
Employment, 1988). On the one hand, there are those in receipt of benefit 
who are not regarded as actively seeking work, and, on the other hand, 
there are those actively seeking work who are not eligible for or not 
claiming benefit.
Transitions out of unemployment defined on one basis may not occur on 
the other. A marked rise in the generosity of benefits might lead some 
persons registered as unemployed to stop searching for a job. On the other 
hand, the converse is also possible, where for example the eligibility 
conditions for benefits are changed. In this instance government policy 
may result in flows between two states on an official definition without 
having any genuine impact on individual behaviour. This may be one reason 
for the flows between "out of the labour force" and unemployment. The West 
German evidence of Cramer and Werner (1982) for males aged 24 and over 
shows that, for those where the previous labour market state was known, 
more than a third of those entering unemployment had not at that previous 
date been in work (including job creation schemes). In a British study, 
Heady and Smyth (1989) found that for 30 per cent of a sample of family 
heads aged 20-59 with a registered unemployment spell of at least 3 months 
in 1983, employment was not the most recent classifiable pre-registration 
labour force state. In the US, Flinn and Heckman (1983) investigated 
whether the two states of "not in the labour force" and "unemployment" were 
behaviourally distinct, the test being whether the exit probabilities to 
employment from the two states were determined in different ways. They 
concluded that this was the case, although the small size and special 
nature of their sample should be noted.
Within the "not in the labour force" group, there are a variety of 
different situations, including those who are sick, those caring for 
children and other dependants, those engaged in other unpaid work, those 
who are retired, and those in education. It seems particularly important 
from the point of view of labour market policy to treat separately those 
situations where the person is in full-time training or education. The 
special employment measures which have accompanied the rises in 




























































































into, and overall importance of, government sponsored training as a labour 
market state. A dramatic example is provided by the youth labour market in 
the UK. In 1979, 11 per cent of 16 year old school-leavers were on the 
government’s Youth Opportunities Programme; in January 1982 this figure was 
26 per cent while by January 1987 exactly half of all 16 year-old leavers 
were participating in its successor, the Youth Training Scheme (Central 
Statistica Office 1982, 1985). Edin (1989) draws attention to government 
schemes in Sweden and reports that in the late 1970s "almost 4% of the 
labour force was engaged in various labour market programs at a time when 
open unemployment was slightly more than 2%" (p.20). Details of the 
numbers involved in Sweden are given in Standing (1988, Tables 9 and 10).
ii) Regular and marginal employment
The above discussion suggests that we might view the labour market as 
being comprised of four states: employment, unemployment, 
training/education, and inactivity (which may include unpaid work). As we 
have stressed, each of these states may cover a range of different 
situations, and the classifications should be regarded as no more than a 
convenient analytical simplification. In the case of employment, however, 
it would in our view be wrong to treat this as a homogeneous state even as 
a simplification, and in particular we should distinguish between what we 
call "regular" and what we call "marginal" jobs. Regular jobs have the 
expectation of lengthy employment, are covered by statutory employment 
protection, and are part of the legal economy. They may also offer some 
prospect of promotion and may involve a substantial element of general or 
specific training. Marginal jobs lack one or more of these attributes. 
They may be temporary; they may be part of the black economy; they may be 
"dead-end" jobs.
There are reasons to suppose that the past decade has seen a rise in 
jobs having "marginal" attributes. In the UK, the situation has been 
described by Dahrendorf as follows:
"Significant numbers find themselves at the margin. ... If 
'decasualization', that is the permanent employment of hitherto 
casual labour, was one of Beveridge's prescriptions against 
unemployment before the First World War, one observes a certain 
'recasualization' today. This is not always involuntary, but it 




























































































In the United States, Katz and Summers have referred to
"Evidence suggesting that the bulk of employment growth in the 
United States has ocurred in sectors that are thought to provide 
'low wage, bad jobs' rather than in sectors that provide 'high 
wage, good jobs'" (1989, p 209).
Taking a low-wage cut-off of 50 per cent of median earnings in 1973, 
Bluestone and Harrison (1988) found that the share of low wage employment 
expanded rapidly between 1979 and 1986 and that this could not be explained 
by purely cyclical factors. The growth of marginal jobs may be a 
by-product of measures to increase labour market "flexibility". Emerson 
(1988) has noted the change between the 1970s and the 1980s with regard to 
legislation concerning short-term contract labour:
"The 1970s saw in Europe widespread legislation making these 
regulations more comprehensive or restrictive. The France 
government’s legislation of 1982 appears to be the last example of 
the period of tightening regulations. Since then several 
countries have opened wider opportunities for fixed-term contracts 
as a way of easing the burden of severe restraints or dismissals." 
(1988, p 797).
That this applies also to France is illustrated by the observation in the 
OECD Employment•Outlook that in that country
"Contracts of limited duration are a particular legal form 
allowing employers to circumvent some of the provisions of 
employment protection legislation. These latter forms of 
employment are now numerically more important than agency or 
temporary work, following rapid growth in recent years" (OECD, 
1989, p 181).
Our distinction between regular and marginal jobs is similar to that 
between primary sector and secondary sector in the dual labour market 
theory of Doeringer and Piore (1971). Jobs in the primary sector are 
characterised by employment stability and promotion from within (an 
"internal" labour market). Jobs in the secondary sector involve low job 
stability, little training, and poor promotion opportunities. The primary 
sector is typified by large manufacturing establishments and the secondary 
sector by small service sector firms. However, the nature of employment 
does not necessarily follow sectoral or firm lines: the same firm may offer 




























































































retailer is a regular job; part-time work in the same firm as Father 
Christmas paid in cash is a marginal job. For this reason, we prefer our 
own terminology, referring to jobs rather than sectors, although we discuss 
in Section 2 the dual labour market theories. In the US there has been a 
debate about 'bad jobs, good jobs' as in the earlier reference to Katz and 
Summers (see too Loveman and Tilly, 1988 and 1988a and Esping-Andersen, 
1990, who also considers West Germany and Sweden). But we deliberately 
avoid such a terminology since we do not wish to make such judgements about 
the valuation of job attributes. There may well be workers who prefer the 
characteristics of a maginal job to regular employment.
In the present context, an important difference between regular and 
marginal jobs is that the latter are less likely to be covered by 
unemployment insurance. The contributions conditions for unemployment 
insurance in many countries require a substantial spell of employment 
within a given period. For example, workers with recurrent periods of 
unemployment in the UK are less likely to qualify for benefit on account of 
the rules which link spells of receipt separated by only short periods of 
work. Black economy jobs paid in cash will not result in any unemployment 
insurance contributions being paid.
We distinguish between regular and marginal jobs not only because of 
their different implications for the future benefit status of the person 
concerned but also because the pattern of transitions is likely to be 
different. In the case of duration of job tenure, for example, Stern 
(1989, Table 6.2) reports a monthly unemployment inflow rate for men in the 
UK in Autumn 1978 of 5.8 per cent from jobs of less than a year in length 
compared with 0.9 per cent for jobs of 1-3 years and 0.2 per cent for jobs 
of over 10 years. This has a number of explanations, but reflects in part 
the fact that some jobs are short-term by nature; using the same data, 
Wood (1982, Table 37) records a fifth of the male inflow reporting that the 
reason for their entering unemployment was that their previous job was only 
temporary.
Evidence also suggests that substantial numbers of moves out of 
unemployment are to temporary jobs, the figures being disproportionately 




























































































(OECD, 1987, p.40). Of those previously unemployed persons shown as in 
employment in Table 1 above, between one-fifth and two-fifths in each 
European country had temporary jobs. (The definition of a temporary job 
clearly needs to be treated with care, this not necessarily precluding 
employment available on an indefinite basis in which a survey respondent 
expresses the intention to stay for only a limited period.) The size of 
the outflows from unemployment to temporary jobs reflects in part the
existence of labour market programmes providing or subsidising temporary 
work.
We can also draw on evidence on the recurrence of unemployment to show 
that exits from unemployment are quite frequently made to a state (work or 
otherwise) that is temporary. For example, in 1983 the proportion of 
persons experiencing unemployment who had more than one spell during the 
year was 21 percent in Australia, 24 per cent in Sweden and 32 per cent in 
the US (OECD, 1985, Table 37). The proportion of all time in unemployment
accounted for by multiple spells in these three countries was 21 per cent,
29 per cent and 39 per cent respectively. Again, this evidence is
consistent with jobs being of a temporary nature due to the supply side of 
the market as well as the demand side, but amongst the unemployed in the 
spring of 1985 in Great Britain, twice as many men gave the ending of a 
temporary job as the main reason for entering unemployment as reported 
voluntary quitting. For single and married women the ratios were 3:2 and 
1:1 respectively (OPCS, 1987, Table 4.19). Taking all the unemployed, the 
ending of temporary employment was cited by 20 per cent of those who had 
left a job within the last three years.
We have been discussing the flows, in both directions, between 
unemployment and marginal jobs, but an important question is whether 
marginal jobs provide a stepping stone to regular jobs. Are marginal jobs 
a "dead-end" or a "way-station" (Esping-Andersen, 1990)? In a number of 
the recent dual labour market models it is assumed that entry to regular 
jobs (in our terminology) can only take place from unemployment or that the 
probability of employment in a regular job is less for people holding 
marginal jobs. For example McDonald and Solow (1985), argue that
"secondary employment may be regarded as a kind of stigma that




























































































workers are regarded by primary market employers as 'inferior' or 
'unreliable', some gesture of separation from the secondary market 
may increase the chance of being offered a primary-sector iob" 
(1985, p 1124-5).
Unemployment in this model may therefore be seen as 'wait' unemployment, 
not dissimilar from the time spent searching in a standard search model. 
The fact that many of those newly hired by employers come directly from 
other jobs has been advanced as a criticism of the latter model and it 
might be seen too as undermining the dual labour market version. A 
significant proportion of employees are engaged in job search and this 
proportion is higher for those in temporary jobs: in the UK according to 
Pissarides and Wadsworth (1988), 5 per cent of male employees were engaged 
in search in 1984 and this rises to 34 per cent for those in temporary 
jobs. However, this does not tell us whether these people found regular 
jobs, and evidence is needed on the actual flows between marginal jobs and 
regular jobs before we can assess the validity of the assumption underlying 
the wait unemployment model that there is a lower (or zero) probability of 
making this transition.
A rather different classification of the outflows from unemployment to 
employment would be to distinguish between a new job and return to the last 
employer. This is an important distinction from both the demand side as 
well as the supply side of the labour market. Employers may, via layoffs 
followed by recalls, use the unemployment benefit system as a way of seeing 
them through temporary falls in demand. An unemployed worker who expects 
to be recalled may have little incentive to search for another job and thus 
react differently to changes in unemployment benefits.
Temporary layoff unemployment is a prominent feature of the US economy 
and it has been argued that it accounts for more than half of all 
unemployment (e.g. Feldstein, 1976). In Canada, Robertson (1989) notes 
that half of all recipients of unemployment insurance (UI) in 1984 returned 
to their pre-unemployment employer. He estimates that about a quarter of 
all weeks of unemployment (including those not covered by UI) were spent in 
spells starting with a layoff and ending with recall. Osberg et al. (1986) 
also highlight the prevalence of recall in Canada but note that it is much 




























































































States by Katz and Meyer (1988), who show that the rate of recall is 64 per 
cent of all job losers in manufacturing but only 35 per cent for service 
sector workers. To the extent that what we have called marginal jobs are 
centered in the service sector, it may be that temporary layoffs are more a 
feature of regular employment. Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen (1989) note 
the importance of layoff unemployment in Denmark where they estimate that 
at least 40 percent of unemployment spells during 1979-84 were due to 
temporary layoffs and that these spells accounted for at least 16 per cent 
of all unemployment in that period. However, in general this form of 
unemployment is much less common in Europe and other OECD countries than in 
the US (Fitzroy and Hart, 1985). Even in the US, a significant minority of 
those on temporary layoff are not in fact rehired by their previous 
employer and this underlines the importance of distinguishing between 
recall expectations and actual outcomes (Katz, 1986, Katz and Meyer, 1988).
iii) Labour market transitions: a summary
The view of the labour market described above may be summarised in the 
terms of a 5 x 5 transition matrix between the states of:
- unemployment
- regular employment 
marginal employment 
not in the labour force
- training and education
Whereas it is the transitions between employment and unemployment which 
have been the principal focus of much of the literature on the effects of 
unemployment compensation, we have argued that it is important to 
distinguish regular from marginal employment. Is the effect of
retrenchment in unemployment compensation to increase the outflow from 
unemployment to regular jobs or is it an increase in marginal employment 
which is induced? We have drawn attention to studies which show the 
significance of "not in the labour force". Are the effects of cuts in 
unemployment benefit to increase the rate of exit from unemployment, not 
into employment, but out of the labour force? Does the existence of 
unemployment insurance lead to people registering as unemployed rather than 




























































































security which allows people to give up their jobs and acquire training?
As hardly needs stressing, the representation is over-simplified and 
there are important aspects - such as the role of self-employment - that we 
shall not be considering. Moreover, we are treating the states as 
exclusive, whereas a person may be in part-time employment, for example, at 
the same time as being in training or education. A person may - legally or 
illegally - be in paid work at the same time as registering as unemployed. 
Finally, we have noted the differences in definition of the labour market 
states, and in particular that unemployment may be defined in 
administrative or behavioural terms. It should also be obvious that there
are important life-cycle aspects. The transitions to and from training are 
likely to be particularly important for those in the younger age groups; 
the transition from not in the labour force applies to women returning 
after they have had children; retirement may take the form of moving from 





























































































2. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN THEORY 
i) Unemployment compensation in theory and practice
Beginning their review of different explanations of the natural rate of 
unemployment, Johnson and Layard observe that in a simple market-clearing 
demand and supply model of the labour market, unemployment benefit 
increases the level of unemployment and note that this effect is "as in all 
our models" (1986, p.923). If one looks at the models in question, one 
finds that the unemployment benefit with which they are concerned is of the 
following ’hypothetical' form:
(a) the benefit is paid irrespective of the reasons for entry 
into unemployment,
(b) it is paid independently of the person's efforts to search for new 
employment, or of his or her availability for work,
(c) there is no penalty to the refusal of job offers,
(d) there are no contribution conditions related to past employment 
record,
(e) the benefit is paid at a flat rate,
(f) benefit is paid for an unlimited duration,
(g) eligibility for benefit is not affected by the level of income of 
other household members.
In other words, it is quite unlike any real-world system of unemployment 
compensation. In this mis-representation, Layard and Johnson are not 
alone; with some notable exceptions - which we discuss below - the 
theoretical literature on unemployment benefit largely ignores important 
institutional features of actual social security schemes. Unemployment 
compensation is often treated as if it were simply the wage of the 
unemployed, as illustrated by such assumptions as "the wage income when 
working is w, and is b when not working" (Oswald, 1986, p 369).
As we have noted in the Introduction, it is important to distinguish 
between unemployment insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA). We 
start with UI. It is true that this can be approximated by some of the 




























































































does not depend on the income received by other household members, so that 
condition (g) is satisfied. (An exception is where dependant's additions 
are conditional on the dependant not receiving income in excess of a 
specified amount, as in the UK where the unemployment insurance addition 
for a dependant wife is paid only where she earns less than this amount - 
see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985, Chapter 2). But the remaining (a) to 
(f) are typically replaced by conditions like the following:
(a') benefit is refused where a person has entered unemployment 
voluntarily or as a result of industrial misconduct,
(b') benefit is conditional on the person making demonstrable efforts 
to search for new employment, and on being available for work; 
this often requires registration at a state employment agency,
(c') refusal of suitable job offers, beyond some specified number, 
leads to disqualification for benefit,
(d* ) the benefit is contributory, with contributions typically being 
paid by employers (possibly on an experience-related basis) and 
employees according to a schedule which is related to earnings, 
and there being contribution conditions for UI benefit with 
eligibility depending on past record of insured employment,
(e') the amount of benefit received while unemployed may depend on past 
earnings,
(f') UI benefit is paid for a limited duration, and the rate of 
benefit may decline over time.
These conditions, coupled with (g) , may be taken to describe the general 
form of UI. In setting out these features, we have not described the UI 
system of any one particular country but have attempted to summarise 
features representative of those found in the 21 OECD members that have 
such schemes (the exceptions being Australia, New Zealand and Turkey). The 
actual details of UI schemes do of course differ considerably across 
countries. (A valuable, if now dated, survey of unemployment insurance 
schemes is provided by Blaustein and Craig, 1977. See also CERC, 1983.)
Unemployment assistance (UA) differs from UI in several crucial 
respects, although again there is considerable diversity across countries. 




























































































typically conditional on not being liable for the unemployment, on seeking 
work, and on not refusing job offers. A recent example is the new revenu 
minimum d'insertion in France, where income support is linked to measures 
for 're-integration into society'. However, UA is by definition 
non-contributory, so that condition (d) of the hypothetical form does apply 
to UA. Similarly, in a number of countries, but not all, UA is paid 
without limit on duration (condition (f)). But the most important feature 
of UA is that it is subject to a test of means:
(e") the amount of UA benefit received depends on other income and on 
assets via a means-test,
and this test is typically applied either to the inner family (husband, 
wife and dependant children) or to the household as a whole, so that
(g") the amount of UA benefit is affected by the level of income and 
assets of other household members.
These aspects of UA mean that its impact on work incentives may be quite 
different from that of UI. Most importantly, it may impose a high 
effective marginal tax rate on the earnings of the partners of unemployed 
persons, since the UA is typically reduced if they have earnings (there may 
be a disregard provision but this is typically small). Equally, it may act 
to discourage savings, since capital enters the means test either via the 
income test or via a separate assets test.
To summarise, in what follows we take UI to be characterised by (a') to 
(f'), and (g), and UA to be characterised by (a’) to (c'), (d), (e"), (f)
and (g"). In relating these 'ideal types' to actual real-world schemes, we 
include under UA general schemes of assistance to which any individual on 
low income may be able to apply as well as means-tested benefit schemes 
specifically for the unemployed. In neither the UK nor the US is there a 
scheme of the latter type but the general assistance benefit, Income 
Support (previously Supplementary Benefit), plays the role of UA in Britain 
in a way that is not matched by assistance programmes in the US. Like the 
UI schemes, these vary considerably between states, only half of which, for 




























































































an unemployed head (Williams et al, 1982, p.494). General assistance acts 
as a residual programme but does not provide a nationwide safety net for 
the unemployed. European countries have, in the main, substantially more 
extensive assistance benefit schemes for those not entitled to UI or who 
exhaust entitlement and this represents an important institutional 
difference between the US and many other OECD countries. West Germany, for 
example, has a three-tier system: an explicit UA programme
(Arbeitslosenhilfe) alongside UI (Arbeitslosengeld) as well as a general 
assistance benefit (Sozialhilfe) for which the unemployed may apply.
Unemployment assistance programmes are the responsibility of the state, 
whether local or national, but unemployment insurance may be provided by 
private bodies, either employers or trade unions. In the United States, 
there are supplemental unemployment benefits paid by employers to workers 
on temporary layoff, negotiated as part of collective bargaining. Such 
employer benefits form part of the theory of implicit contracts with 
asymmetric information (Grossman and Hart, 1981), but their empirical 
relevance appears limited. According to Oswald (1986, Table 1) in US 
manufacturing in 1980 such plans covered about 50 per cent of workers in 
unionised plants and companies with at least 1000 workers, but the 
percentage was very small (4 per cent) outside manufacturing, and it seems 
reasonable to assume that such employer-schemes are restricted to (part) of 
the regular employment sector. The second possibility is for union-schemes. 
In nineteenth century Britain a substantial number of trade unions provided 
out of work benefits to their members, and a number continue to do so 
(Beenstock and Brasse, 1986). In Sweden, Finland and Denmark, the
unemployment insurance funds have close ties with the trade union movement: 
"for most purposes, a UI fund may be regarded as an integral part of a 
trade union" (Holmlund and Lundborg, 1988, p 161). In this paper, we 
concentrate on UI schemes that are operated by the state.
Examination of the benefit statistics for countries that operate both 
UI and UA schemes reveals that the unemployed fall into four categories:
- those receiving only UI
- those receiving UA in supplementation of UI
- those receiving only UA




























































































Individuals not receiving UI will include those who are not eligible 
because they fail to meet the contribution conditions (d'), those who have 
been disqualified (a', b' or c'), and those who have exhausted their 
entitlement (f'). It is for these reasons that only a fraction of the 
unemployed receive UI. According to Burtless, in the US in 1982 the 
insured unemployment rate was under half the total unemployment rate (1983, 
Table 1). Blank and Card (1989) report that by 1987, the proportion of 
the unemployed receiving UI was less than 30 per cent and conclude that 
lower take-up has been one important reason for a fall in the level of UI 
receipt in the US. In Britain, the proportion of those registered as 
unemployed in 1988 who were actually receiving UI was only 24 per cent for 
men and 34 per cent for women (our own calculations based on unpublished 
administrative analyses of 5 per cent samples of the unemployed taken in 
May and November). These figures refer to those claiming benefits, so that 
poor take-up does not help to explain the lack of coverage. The most 
important reasons for absence of UI were the failure to satisfy condition 
(d') - insufficient contributions to qualify - and the impact of condition 
(f') through the exhaustion of the duration of entitlement; these two 
reasons accounted for 29 per cent and 56 per cent respectively of male 
non-recipients and 43 per cent and 31 per cent of females. 
(Disqualificatipn on the other hand, occurred in less than 1 per cent of 
cases for both sexes).
The US and the UK may be rather extreme cases so far as their low 
coverage of UI is concerned, but the existence of a sizeable fraction of 
the unemployed who do not receive UI is a feature of other OECD countries. 
Burtless (1987) reports the proportion of the unemployed in receipt of UI 
in 1985 to be 39 per cent in France, 55 per cent in West Germany and 68 per 
cent in Sweden.
Of those not eligible for UI, some will not receive support from UA 
because they have other income (eg from savings) or because they have a 
partner with earnings which takes them above the eligibility limit. Others 
are eligible but do not claim the assistance to which they are entitled 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985, provide evidence on non-take-up of UA for 
Britain). Taking just those individuals registered as unemployed and 

































































































UI and UA 6
UA only 56
No UI nor UA 18
(source: authors' calculations using 5 per cent sample of claimants)
This means that nearly 1 in 5 of those registered as claimants receive no 
benefit and there are as well those not registered who are also not in 
receipt.
Analysts of unemployment often treat UI and UA as being little 
different in their predicted implications, but this is not the case. There 
is a clear hierachy with UI ranking ahead of UA on several counts. First, 
as described above, the conditions under which the two benefits are paid 
are very different with respect to the unit of assessment and the extent to 
which people have a clear title to benefit. Secondly, the level of benefit 
paid out on the latter may be lower. This may come about through 
means-testing or it may be because the maximum benefit level under UA is 
less than that on UI, even for someone with no other income. In West 
Germany, both UI and UA payments are related to past earnings but the 
maximum benefit-earnings ratio is some 10 percentage points lower for UA. 
Moreover, whereas UI payments are not reduced by income testing, this often 
leads to a reduction in UA payments. In April 1983, a third of those 
receiving UA in West Germany had their payments reduced by the means-test 
(Reubens, 1989). In the UK, neither UI nor UA are related to past earnings 
and the relationship between the benefit levels under the two schemes is 
such that it is possible for the benefit received under UA to be no lower 
than under UI. However, amongst men unemployed for less than a year in the 
1970s, we have estimated that in two-thirds of cases exhaustion of UI would 
have implied a reduction in benefit, the fall being on average enough to 
reduce the ratio of benefit to last earnings by 8 percentage points 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985, table 7.5). For married women, the 
exhaustion of UI in Britain means in most cases a complete loss of 
benefits. As these examples from West Germany and the UK illustrate, the 




























































































benefit is concerned. To talk about these countries as having
"indefinite" benefits for the unemployed (Layard, 1989, Table 13.2) is to 
gloss over an important distinction.
ii) The job search model
The conclusions drawn with regard to UI or UA depend on the assumptions 
made with regard to the working of the labour market. Much of the 
econometric work on the probability of return to employment is based on a 
model of job search. In the ’standard’ job search model, the distribution 
of wages is treated as exogenous and in simple versions of the model the 
intensity of search is fixed. The strategy of the unemployed worker is 
described in terms of a reservation wage, a job being accepted if and only 
if the offered wage exceeds this level, and the reservation wage rises with 
the level of unemployment benefit. This leads to the prediction that 
increases in unemployment compensation lead to a reduced probability of 
making the transition from unemployment to employment.
The standard model (for example, Lippman and McCall, 1979) assumes that 
a person is concerned with the expected present value of income over an 
infinite horizon, discounted at rate p. A job once accepted is assumed to 
last forever at a constant wage, w. The person is assumed to receive job 
offers at a constant rate X per unit of time and the probability of a job 
offering a wage of at least w is the same, 1 - F(w), at all dates (there is 
a stationary distribution of wage offers). Past job offers cannot be 
recalled. When out of work the person has a value of leisure, or home 
production, v. If the level of unemployment compensation is assumed 
constant over time, and is denoted by b, there is a stationary reservation 
wage, w*, which must satisfy the following condition (see, for example, 
Hey, 1979, Chapter 14):
w* - (b+v) - X (1-F(w*))[w** - w*]/ p 
where w** is the expected wage conditional on w ^ w*.
The choice of the reservation wage may be seen as balancing, on the 




























































































the right hand side, the improvement over w* expected from holding out, 
where this improvement is an infinite stream and hence is discounted at a 
rate p. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Where w* is greater than the 
lowest wage which is offered, wQ, a rise in the benefit leads to a 
reduction in the probability of return to work, as shown. If w* is less 
than wQ, then the person would accept any job offer, and the probability of 
return to work is simply X - see the lower part of Figure 1. In this 
situation an increase in benefit would have no effect, at least within a 
certain range. In the special case where there are only two wage offers 
that a person may receive - a good job paying w^ or a bad job paying wQ - 
the reservation wage is a weighted average of w^ and the net income 
unemployed (b+v). It is assumed that the good job is preferable to being 
unemployed (w^ ^ b+v), but this is not necessarily true for the bad job, in 
which case it is possible that the reservation wage is less than wQ, so 
that variations in the level of unemployment compensation make no
difference, within a range.
(iii) Modelling unemployment compensation
To what system of unemployment compensation does this analysis
correspond? Is it UI? First of all, it is obvious that the assumption of 
an unlimited duration of benefit is an inappropriate one. The implications 
of a limited duration of benefit, condition (f1) in our schema, have been 
examined by Mortensen (1977) and Burdett (1979), two of the relatively 
small number of scholars who have paid attention to the real-world features 
of unemployment compensation. Moreover, they bring out the importance of 
the assumption in the standard search model that a job, once accepted, 
lasts for ever. As is pointed out by Hey and Mavromaras,
"After all, unemployment insurance is supposed to be insurance
against the misfortune of becoming unemployed, and not simply a
subsidy to prevent starvation while searching for a suitable 
(lifetime) occupation" (1981, p 318).
Where there is a risk of future unemployment, then the existence of UI 
reduces the risk of returning to work, as has been shown by Mortensen:
"an increase in either the benefit rate or the maximum benefit 
period induces an increase in the indirect utility of being laid 




























































































unemployed during a current spell in the case of a qualified [for 
UI] worker. Because employment is more attractive as a 
consequence of the first effect, it tends to offset the increase 
in the incentive to remain unemployed implied by the second. 
Indeed, the first effect dominates if the worker is near the end 
of his or her benefit period or has exhausted benefits receivable 
during the spell." (Mortensen, 1977, p 511).
This illustrates the fact that UI may have positive as well as negative 
effects on the transition from unemployment to employment.
The analysis of Burdett (1979) also allows for the feature (e') of UI 
in that he examines the implications of the benefit being a linear function 
of the pre-unemployment wage, up to a ceiling, which is typical of the 
benefit formula in many countries, the JK with its flat-rate benefit being 
an exception. A general earnings-related formula is considered by Hey and 
Mavromaras (1981), who make an explicit comparison with a flat-rate 
benefit. As the latter authors note, the impact of contributions - feature 
(d') of UI - may be treated as deductions from wages in employment, where 
it is assumed that the burden falls entirely on the employee. This has 
been further developed by Wright and Loberg (1987) and by Mavromaras 
(1987). The latter, in a general equilibrium setting, shows in numerical 
simulations, that a (first round) expenditure-neutral switch from flat-rate 
payments to a benefit immediately proportional to the previous wage reduces 
the equilibrium unemployment rate. One concern of these authors is the 
choice by workers between jobs with different probabilities of subsequent 
permanent layoff - see also Burdett and Mortensen (1980). Insofar as jobs 
with a high probability of termination correspond to our category of 
'marginal jobs', this may be seen as casting light on the effect of 


























































































































































































We have considered conditions (d* ) , (e') and (f *) of UI benefit; the 
first three conditions (a*), (b * ) and (c') apply also to UA. A number of 
models have made job search endogenous, making the probability of a job 
offer conditional on, for example, the amount spent on search. Mortensen 
(1977) assumes that the probability of a job offer is proportional to the 
amount of time spent searching, the cost of search being foregone leisure; 
Barron and Mellow (1979) allow the probability to depend both on time and 
money spent. The standard result is that a rise in benefits reduces the 
time per week unemployed spent searching, thus reducing the probability of 
transition to employment, but that the money spent on job search may 
increase. Moreover, if time spent and market expenditures are complementary 
inputs, then the total effect may be ambiguous (Tannery, 1983). Similarly, 
if we assume that there are binding restrictions on the capacity of the 
unemployed to borrow to finance search activity (as is discussed by 
Flemming, 1978), it is then possible that unemployment compensation would 
increase the resources devoted to search and hence increase the probability 
of return to work (see Ben-Horim and Zuckerman, 1987). Several authors 
have considered the type of search, as opposed to its intensity. In the 
two-period search model of Kahn and Low (1988), the unemployed are seen as 
choosing between systematic search, which involves collecting information 
on the wages offered by specific firms and random search of the 
conventional type where the worker elicits offers from a distribution which 
is known a priori but where the searcher is ignorant of the particular 
offer any firm will make. Systematic search is assumed costly in both time 
and money but is more likely to lead to an acceptable wage, conditional on 
an offer being made. Increases in unemployment compensation therefore 
increase the probability of systematic search.
Although reference is made on occasion to the relevance of search 
activity to the conditions of eligibility for benefit (for example, Baily, 
1977, p 386), this is not typically made explicit in the analysis of the 
effects of unemployment compensation. The probability of disqualification 
if search activity falls below some minimum required level needs to be 
introduced; in terms of modelling, the raw materials are there but they are 
not applied. In fact, a number of contributions to the literature contain 
elements which are relevant to the consideration of features such as (a'), 




























































































unemployment compensation. For example, Wright (1987) draws attention to 
the crucial role played by the assumptions whether or not a person may 
sample new jobs at once after quitting or being laid off. This is a 
valuable clarification, but more important in reality than the delay in 
being able to search for a new job offer is likely to be the delay in 
receiving unemployment benefit in the event of quitting, whereas he makes 
only a passing reference to the latter possibility.
The analysis of the monitoring of benefit receipt introduces a source 
of uncertainty additional to that arising from the uncertain arrival of 
wage offers. Uncertainty about the system of unemployment compensation may 
be just as important. Loss of benefit may be feared even if the person is 
fulfilling the conditions, and means-tested benefits in particular seem 
liable to generate these anxieties. The operation of means tests 
inevitably involves Type I error as well as Type II, with some eligible 
claimants being denied benefit, as well as some inéligibles allowed 
receipt. (For discussion of the balance between these types of error, see 
Goodin, 1985, and Atkinson, 1988.) There may also be uncertainty 
concerning benefits in work that has been investigated by Jenkins and 
Millar (1989), who stress that making the transition from unemployment to 
work involves a risk in that the level of in-work benefits (such as 
means-tested assistance to working families) is not known in advance and is 
subject to uncertainty. In their analysis they allow for risk aversion on 
the part of workers, which is evidently a more realistic assumption than 
that of risk neutrality made so far here.
There are indeed a number of features of the present model that are 
either unrealistic or which need to be relaxed in a full model of the 
labour market. Most importantly, we have only looked at one side of the 
market. The worker is assumed to treat the wage offers as exogenously 
given. The behaviour of employers, and their role in filling jobs, has not 
yet been considered. In the search theory context, there is the central 
question as to what determines the wage offer distribution. As Rothschild 
(1973) pointed out, the standard search model is only "partial-partial", 
lacking an explanation as to why there should be a distribution of wage 





























































































Before bringing together the two sides of the market, we may consider 
the effect of unemployment compensation from the standpoint of an employer 
who takes as given the conditions on which labour is supplied. Brechling 
(1977) for example has considered the choice between increasing hours per 
worker and increasing the number of workers, and the decision as to how 
rapidly to lay off redundant workers, by an employer who faces a supply of 
labour at a given wage. In a detailed analysis of the determinants of the 
taxable payroll in the US, he shows how the decisions are affected by 
experience-rating and by the fact that there is an annual ceiling on pay 
for which employer contributions are payable. Among other items, he draws 
attention to the fact that the cost, in terms of additional contributions, 
arising from voluntary quits (this raising the ratio of the taxable to the 
total payroll for the firm) , may lead employers to be "reluctant to hire 
employees from groups that have a high propensity to quit voluntarily" 
(1977, p 492). This may in turn have implications for the willingness of 
employers to recruit among those currently holding marginal jobs.
The representation of the labour supply side in terms of a specified 
wage does not allow for the fact that there may be a trade-off between the 
wage paid and the probability of continued employment. The reservation 
level of utility for workers is one of the ingredients in the implicit 
contract theories which again focus on the employer side of the market. 
Firms are assumed to design an optimal contract to share risk arising from 
uncertain future demand, or to even out known seasonal fluctuations, 
subject to a reservation utility level. As has been argued by Baily (1977) 
and Feldstein (1976), tax exempt unemployment benefits and imperfect 
experience-rating (so that firms do not pay the marginal actuarial cost of 
a layoff) may provide an inducement for employers to lay off workers. This 
increases the employment/unemployment transition probability. As the 
subsequent literature has shown, however, the precise implications depend 
on the degrees of risk aversion of employees and employers and on the 
information which both sides possess. In a model due to Mortensen (1983), 
unemployment benefit and layoffs may be positively related even if there is 
perfect experience-rating. Topel (1983) argues that the sign of any effect 
of unemployment insurance is ambiguous. If there is perfect 




























































































government above that which would have existed privately (risk averse 
workers are assumed) then the cost of layoffs will be increased and the 
incidence of unemployment will decline.
iv) Equilibrium theories
The market approach to search behaviour has been the subject of a 
sizeable literature, which, beginning with Diamond (1971), has sought to 
explain the existence of an equilibrium non-degenerate distribution of wage 
offers. Why should there be a persistent need for search? If such a 
non-degenerate distribution of offers exists, how is it affected by 
unemployment compensation? Is the effect of a rise in benefits more 
important for the wages offered than for the acceptance probability?
The equilibrium approach may be illustrated by reference to the work of 
Albrecht and Axell (1984), who show how a two-wage (wQ and w^) equilibrium 
may arise where there are two different types of people, differing 
according to the value of their leisure/home production, vQ and v^, where 
vQ ^ v^; and where there is heterogeneity in firms in terms of the 
productivity of labour. In a dispersion equilibrium, a fraction of firms 
will offer w^ equal to (v^+b) , where b is the amount of unemployment 
benefit, and the remainder offer a wage wQ which is a weighted average of 
wi and (vQ+b) . In this equilibrium model, in which the wage offer 
distribution is endogenous, a general rise in unemployment benefit 
increases the higher wage £1 for each £1 increase in benefit. It also 
increases the lower wage, but, where the density of the distribution of 
firms according to productivity is non-decreasing, by less than £1. The 
equilibrium rate of unemployment rises (under the same condition on the 
density).
This model of equilibrium search, like others of a similar kind, makes 
a valuable contribution but also serves to illustrate some of the 
shortcomings. First, the model has certain predictions which may cast 
doubt on the real-world applicability of the findings. The reader may for 
example be surprised that the effect of unemployment compensation is to 
widen the wage distribution, whereas it is often asserted that its effect 




























































































the unemployed in this model are entirely those who are better endowed (in 
terms of the value of leisure/home production), waiting until they get a 
high wage offer. Second, the unemployment benefit bears no relation to 
either UI or UA. The fact that the unemployed consist entirely of those 
who have not held a job (a job once accepted lasts for a lifetime) means 
that they cannot have fulfilled the contribution conditions for UI. The 
fact that they have rejected the offer of a low wage job means that under 
typical UI and UA schemes they would, at least in principle, be in danger 
of being disqualified from benefit.
In their mis-representation of unemployment compensation, Albrecht and 
Axell are not alone, as we have stressed earlier; and in the majority of 
papers dealing with unemployment benefit in an equilibrium setting (such as 
job-matching models) the benefit is assumed to have very unrealistic 
properties. Here we concentrate on two contributions which have paid 
explicit attention to the key features we identified at the start of this 
section.
The analysis of Burdett and Mortensen (1980) serves to illustrate both 
the role of institutional features of UI and the implications of looking at 
both sides of the market. They allow for search behaviour by workers and 
the offer of contracts by employers which include the possibility of 
layoff. Under the assumptions they make, there exists a wage such that an 
unemployed worker is willing to accept a job irrespective of the risk of 
layoff; on the other hand, he can continue to search while employed for a 
more acceptable job. This means that an employer must pay a premium to 
retain a worker's permanent attachment. In equilibrium, there is 
unemployment of both those searching for a position and those attached to a 
firm but laid-off. Burdett and Mortensen use the model to examine the 
equilibrium effects of UI, where they explicitly treat the fact that new 
entrants do not qualify for benefit, this being a crucial feature, as we 
have noted earlier. The effect of UI is, as in the analysis of Feldstein 
(1976) and others, to reduce the cost of layoff (there is no 
experience-rating) and it leads firms to increase their desired number of 
attached workers, which induces a rise in the equilibrium wage. This in 
turn leads to a reduction in the level of search unemployment as it 




























































































layoff probability increases on account of the rise in UI but this may be 
offset by the rise in the equilibrium wage. As the authors comment, the 
implications are "much richer" and this sort of model illustrates the 
variety of effects that unemployment compensation may have.
The second example is the analysis of Pissarides (1979) . This is more 
limited in that he does not seek to explain the wage level (it is assumed 
that all jobs pay the same exogenous wage), but he provides more detail of 
the process by which jobs are filled. In particular, he introduces an 
important real-world feature which we have not so far discussed - a state 
employment agency. Receipt of UI benefit is conditional on registration by 
the unemployed with the agency. There is a fixed rate of benefit at a 
level below the wage rate, so that an unemployed person always accepts a 
job offer. It is payable to all those out of work. The search of the 
unemployed is for a vacancy, not for a job with a rate of pay in excess of 
the reservation wage. (There is equally no search on the job and no 
voluntary quitting.) Firms either register vacancies at the agency or 
advertise positions to attract workers searching privately. The agency 
matches registered vacancies and the unemployed according to a matching 
function. Unemployed who are not placed by the agency may choose to 
engage in private search for a vacancy and those jobs not registered with 
the agency may be filled in this way. There is an exogenous separation 
property for each job.
In this model of matching, it is shown by Pissarides that an increase 
in the rate of unemployment benefit reduces the attractiveness of 
employment and so reduces the returns from private job search. There is a 
decline in the number of workers engaged in private search. Firms respond 
by reducing their advertising and choose to register more of their 
vacancies with the agency, so that both the unemployed and firms rely more 
heavily on the state agency. The equilibrium level of unemployment rises. 
It is possible that a rise in benefit may move the equilibrium to a corner 
where all matchings take place via the agency, in which case further 
increases in benefit have no effect on the level of unemployment.
This analysis introduces certain important institutional elements, 




























































































further how the condition (b') of UI may be enforced, for example by 
linking the payment of benefits to proof of contact with potential 
employers. It may be noted that this policy has been used in practice: for 
example, in the UK there was the "genuinely seeking work test" in the 
inter-war period. This was unpopular with employers as well as the 
unemployed, the former complaining that they were pestered by the latter 
for proof that non-existent jobs had been applied for (Deacon, 1977).
v) Efficiency Wage and Dual Labour Market Theories
Returning to the determination of wages, we consider in this section 
the alternative approach adopted in efficiency wage models. According to 
this approach, labour productivity increases with the wage paid: for 
example, because reduced supervision is necessary, or reduced turnover 
takes place, or on account of improved morale. Employers determine the 
profit-maximising wage and there is no incentive for them to reduce this 
wage in the face of unemployment. Stiglitz (1986) has noted that policy 
consequences may differ markedly with different versions of the efficiency 
wage model and illustrates this by considering the effect of an increase in 
unemployment benefit. Where worker effort depends on the risk of being 
fired for shirking, and the cost of being fired is that the worker has to 
live on unemployment benefit, then the wage paid is equal to the benefit 
plus a premium which depends on the cost of effort and the probability of 
being monitored. In this case, an increase of £1 in the unemployment 
compensation leads to £1 increase in the efficiency wage and this leads in 
turn to a fall in the level of employment (this may be intensified if 
account is taken of the financing of the benefits - see Shapiro and 
Stiglitz, 1984). On the other hand, an increase in benefits may increase 
employment if efficiency wages arise due to firms possessing imperfect 
information concerning the ability of workers. In this version of the 
model, the quality-mix of applicants depends on the wages offered on the 
assumption that workers' ability levels and reservation wages are 
correlated. Firms must hire randomly due to their imperfect information 
(institutional or social constraints are alternative explanations). 
Suppose that an increase in unemployment benefit reduces the search 
intensity of low productivity workers relative to that of workers of higher 




























































































offered wage will rise. Labour demand rises and unemployment falls.
The shirking/supervision cost version of the model has been elaborated 
by Bulow and Summers (1986) to give a dual labour market model. They argue 
that direct transitions between regular and marginal jobs are infrequent: 
"workers who lose primary-sector jobs appear to be very unlikely to accept 
stopgap jobs in the secondary sector" (1986, p. 404). To secure regular 
employment, workers have to queue as unemployed. The cell in the 
transition matrix for movements from marginal to regular jobs is therefore 
empty. (We discussed this assumption in Section 1.) In a model of this 
type, the primary sector has to pay a wage premium over that available in 
the secondary sector; and it can be shown (Atkinson, 1988a) that the wage 
differential between the two sectors is unchanged by a rise in unemployment 
compensation, a finding which may be contrasted with that of Albrecht and 
Axell (1984) cited above. What happens is that there is a rise in 'wait' 
unemployment: the rise in unemployment benefit provides an incentive for 
workers in marginal jobs to quit in order to be considered for regular 
employment. These dual labour market models may be seen as capturing the 
difference between regular and marginal employment, although as we stressed 
earlier this distinction may be better seen as relating to jobs than to 
sectors.
In our view these dual labour market models are of considerable 
interest; at the same time the treatment of unemployment compensation 
leaves a lot to be desired. Most importantly, the central feature of the 
shirking model is the threat of dismissal for industrial misconduct, which 
is relevant to the condition (a') for the receipt of UI. Industrial 
misconduct is not easily defined, and
"it can cover a wide range of disruptive behaviour and bad work, which 
is causally connected with the loss of employment, and where there is 
evidence of fault" (Fenn, 1980, p 243).
It therefore seems likely that shirking would lead to a risk of 
disqualification; and we should note that employers have a strong incentive 
to report job loss as resulting from misconduct insofar as there is 
experience-rating or statutory redundancy payments, because this would 




























































































should therefore not reckon on receiving benefit in the event of dismissal 
for lack of effort. Atkinson (1988a) shows that taking account of this 
condition, together with allowing for benefit exhaustion, and the 
non-coverage of secondary sector workers by UI, may lead to quite different 
conclusions. A rise in the benefit level reduces the level of the primary 
sector wage and increases employment in the primary sector. It is true 
that unemployment rises overall, as more workers are induced to leave 
secondary sector jobs to join the queue for primary sector jobs, but we 
have a rather different perspective on the role of UI.
vi) Theoretical treatment of unemployment compensation: a summary
Our emphasis in this section has been on the institutional features of 
unemployment compensation and the extent to which they affect the 
conclusions drawn with regard to its impact on different labour market 
transitions. The main elements, and the ways in which they have been 
treated, are summarised in Table 2. As this indicates, individual elements 
have received attention in isolated studies and we have focussed in this 
review on these contributions. But the great generality of studies 
reaching conclusions about unemployment compensation have paid scant 
attention to the institutional details. And some elements have been almost 
totally ignored. This applies to the means-tested nature of UA and the 
implications of the family/household assessment, which are particularly 
likely to be important for the decisions of couples. (The literature on 
decisions about hours of work has shown the importance of the 
interdependence of budget constraints.)
The importance of the institutional aspects is a matter on which we 
would like to insist. It might be thought that they are of second-order 
significance, but the specification of the form of unemployment 
compensation may be critical to its economic impact. Any theoretical model 
has to abstract from features of reality, but in abstracting we should not 
lose sight of the essential features.
The second main theme of this paper is that there are several labour 
market states. Much of the theoretical literature on unemployment 




























































































only movements between employment and unemployment. It does not allow for 
people quitting unemployment to leave the labour force or to enter 
full-time training. No account is taken of additions to the labour force. 
It typically does not distinguish between regular and marginal employment. 
There are of course exceptions. The dual labour market theories may be 
seen as capturing the differential quality of employment. There have been 
analyses of retirement decisions (for example, Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978 
and Sheshinski, 1978). As far as training is concerned, human capital and 
other theories are clearly relevant. Kodde (1988) has examined a 
two-period model where decisions about human capital investment allow for 
the possibility of future unemployment. Pissarides (1976) considers the 
impact of unemployment compensation on transitions to and from inactivity. 
Not suprisingly, the effect of a change in benefits on participation hinges 
on whether only active searchers receive unemployment benefits or not. If 
this is the case then a cut in benefits increases transitions from 
unemployment into inactivity as well as employment but if non-participants 
also receive unemployment compensation then the effect of a change in 
benefits is ambiguous since a rise in benefits increases the utility of 
non-participation. There is the 'entitlement effect' of UI which makes 
participation in paid work more attractive. As was identified by Friedman 
in his Nobel Lecture, "the availability of unemployment insurance makes it 
more attractive to enter the labour force" (1977, p. 458). The transition 
from unemployment into government labour market programmes, including 
full-time training, is considered in the search model presented by Hui and 
Trivedi (1986). A low ratio of benefit to training allowance produces an 
incentive to enter the training programme, but if entry to the programme is 
restricted to the long-term unemployed this produces a disincentive to exit 
from unemployment in the pre-eligibility period. But overall it remains 
the case that it is unemployment and employment (regardless of its quality) 


































































































(b*) Conditional on job search
(c') Disqualification for 






Can be treated in shirking 
model (Atkinson, 1988a) and 
in models which allow for 
quitting prospective iob 
(Wright, 1987).
Could be treated in models 
of variable search intensity.
Interaction with state 
employment agency treated 
by Pissarides (1979).
Re-qualification for benefit 
treated in search models 
Mortensen (1977) and Burdett 
(1979) .
Effect of employer contribution 
schedule treated by Brechling 
(1977).
Temporary layoffs treated by 
Feldstein (1976). 
Non-eligibility of new entrants 
treated by Burdett and 
Mortensen (1980).
Non-coverage treated 
in dual labour market model 
(Atkinson, 1988a).
Burdett (1979), Hey and 
Mavromaras (1981),
Mavromaras (1987).
Treated by Mortensen (1977) 
and Burdett (1979).
Unemployment Assistance

































































































3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AND LABOUR MARKET 
TRANSITIONS
i) Assessing the impact of unemployment compensation
The same reservations concerning the emphasis of the theoretical models 
apply to the empirical evidence. First, research has, in the main, been 
concentrated on the total flows into and out of unemployment. We take 
particular note in our account of the evidence of those contributions to 
the literature that have looked at the effect of unemployment compensation 
on separate flows to and from different labour market states. To what 
extent does it matter in practice if we do not distinguish these different 
states? This may be particularly significant when looking at the impact of 
unemployment compensation on the labour market transitions of women and it 
is important to point out that much of the available evidence relates only 
to male workers, which is a serious limitation. One of the major features 
common to OECD labour markets has been the rise in the participation of 
married women, and this has undoubtedly affected the extent to which 
different labour market transitions may be influenced by government policy 
(as with hours of work, where empirical evidence suggests that the labour 
supply responses of women to changes in transfers are rather different from 
that of men).
Secondly, we have seen how unemployment compensation is not a single 
variable, exogenously determined. Benefit payments vary considerably with 
individual characteristics and behaviour, past and present, together with 
the way in which the benefit system is administered. In the same way that 
this has, with some notable exceptions, been ignored in much of the 
theoretical literature, empirical modelling of the impact of unemployment 
compensation runs the danger of skating over important institutional 
details. In this section we look at how analysts have handled unemployment 
compensation in empirical models. It is clear that in common with the 
theoretical literature, the emphasis has typically been on the effects of 
changes in benefit levels rather than the different conditions for receipt 
of UI and UA which we summarised in Section 2. We try and redress the 
balance somewhat by devoting space to those studies which have looked at 




























































































the level of benefit payment.
In assessing what is a sophisticated applied literature we should 
stress that our focus is very much with the treatment of unemployment 
compensation. We are not concerned with the econometric problems of 
estimating models of unemployment duration, for example, except in the case 
where these are relevant to the handling of unemployment compensation. 
Moreover, for reasons of space we cannot consider each study in detail (for 
a review of several British models see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985,
Chapter 8) but we do need to outline the sorts of issues that arise and 
which the reader needs to bear in mind when consulting the original 
sources.
There are several different types of empirical evidence: aggregate
time-series analyses, cross-section studies based on sample surveys or 
panel data on individuals, investigations based on administrative records, 
and experimental evidence. These different sources are sometimes seen in 
adversarial terms, with one group of authors making use of one type of 
evidence and a rival group espousing another. In our view, however, they 
should be seen as complementary. Our review of what theory has to say 
about unemployment benefits suggests a variety of different effects and it 
may be that these can only be revealed with different types of data. The 
aggregate time-series approach provides a direct answer as to the effect of 
temporal variation in parameters of benefit systems on aggregate 
unemployment flows or totals and this is of obvious interest to policy 
makers. A time-series approach has thus been used by those attempting to 
assess the effect of the introduction of earnings-related benefit in the UK 
in 1966 and of the large increases in the real value of benefits in 
Australia in 1972-74, both of which ocurred at the same time as a sharp 
rise in unemployment. This approach, whether as a 'reduced form' with no 
explicit model of the labour market (for example, Maki and Spindler (1975) 
and Grubel and Maki (1976)), or whether as a set of fully-specified 
equations (as in Layard and Nickell, 1986), has the advantage of capturing 
effects on both sides of the market. As we have seen, unemployment benefit 
may affect wage-setting behaviour of firms, with no apparent direct effect 
on the duration of individual unemployment, and this would not be detected 




























































































may give us different results about the effects of unemployment benefits 
without there being any conflict or paradox involved.
The aggregate time-series approach cannot however allow for the diverse 
nature of the budget constraints facing individuals. As far as research on 
the effects of benefit levels is concerned, the typical practice is to 
consider the benefits received by a "representative" worker, or the average 
benefit payments actually received by the unemployed, and compare one of 
these measures with the average earnings of the employed. This fails to 
allow for the fact that the ratio of income while unemployed to that 
received while in work can vary enormously across the population and in a 
manner that is not uniform across time (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1985, for evidence from the UK and Hammermesh, 1977, for the US).
The distinction between UI and UA, and in particular the provisions 
relating to the treatment of family characteristics and income under the 
latter, are major causes of this considerable diversity. Even among those 
individuals receiving UI only, variation in actual replacement rates will 
typically occur despite a single, nationwide, legislated ratio of UI to 
earnings, due to the operation of a maximum threshold on benefit. For 
example, Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen (1989) estimate that less than a 
fifth of the insured workforce in Denmark in 1984 would have received UI at 
the statutory rate of 90 per cent of earnings had they been unemployed, the 
remaining four-fifths being distributed across rates below this because of 
the operation of the maximum benefit rule. The maximum benefit payable was 
fixed in nominal terms in Denmark during 1983-87, implying that this 
measure of the generosity of UI was declining in real value despite the 
statutory benefit-earnings ratio being constant. It is clearly very 
difficult to pick a single series which will represent the changes over 
time in the generosity of what, given the existence of UA as well, may be a 
complex two-tier unemployment compensation system. Finally, there remains 
the possibility that the parameters of the system of unemployment 
compensation, including the level and duration of benefit, and the system's 
administration may themselves be influenced by the state of the labour 
market. This will occur if higher unemployment is perceived as requiring a 
more generous benefit system (an example is the extended benefit programme 




























































































determined at the aggregate level.
Micro-data from sample surveys or administrative records allow the 
individual variation in benefit receipt and its relation to earnings to be 
modelled, and this source of evidence has been extensively used, in 
particular in those studies motivated by search theory which have looked at 
the determinants of individuals' exit probabilities from unemployment. At 
the same time, the use of micro data is not without problems. Firstly, one 
should not underestimate the difficulties of accurately modelling the 
benefit system at the individual level, allowing for contribution 
conditions for UI, take-up of entitlement to different benefits and any 
changes in the level of compensation over a spell of unemployment brought 
about, for example, by a switch to UA. A single reported figure for the 
benefit in payment at one point of an unemployment spell may not provide 
enough information for the analyst to work from (Atkinson and Micklewright, 
1985, Chapter 6, discuss the problems of calculating "replacement 
histories" in the case of the UK). If unemployment compensation is not 
fixed over a spell of unemployment, then the failure to allow for this when 
modelling unemployment duration represents a specification error.
The problems in allowing for variation in benefits over time in 
stuctural models of unemployment duration which attempt to model the 
separate probabilities of job offer and acceptance is one reason why, in 
our view, reduced form models (which do not attempt to do this) may provide 
results about the effects of benefits on exit probabilities which are more 
reliable. Reduced form models provide a much greater degree of flexibility 
which can be used to handle the institutional details of benefit systems 
although, as with aggregate data, it still needs to be recognised that 
there may be a problem of benefit endogeneity. Florens et al (1988) note 
that in France the variation of unemployment compensation over a spell 
cannot be formalised by a deterministic equation since the benefit 
authorities have some flexibility in the application of the rules. This 
gives rise to additional econometric problems. Access to administrative 
data recording the sequence of actual benefit payments throughout a spell 
represents a substantial advantage. However, there remains a problem that 
these payments may partly proxy determinants of transition probabilities 




























































































complexity of the operation of real-world benefit systems, it becomes clear 
that receipt of benefit is not independent of labour market behaviour. A 
low level of benefit could reflect a poor employment record which the 
econometrician does not observe and hence a low re-employment probability. 
But it might be due to a failure to claim, reflecting an unwillingness to 
live off benefits and turn down job offers.
Secondly, the modelling of inflow or outflow probabilities has been 
based on the assumption that the individuals' experiences of unemployment 
are independent. While this may be true for the sample used in estimation, 
it may not be the case for the population from which the sample is drawn. 
Suppose for example that ceteris paribus we observe that persons with 
higher benefits exit unemployment more slowly. This does not necessarily 
mean that aggregate unemployment is higher since the refusal of jobs by one 
group may lead to the work being offered to others. In other words it is 
the composition of unemployment which is altered. Thus we can think of 
there being an aggregation problem involved with the use of micro-data. (A 
useful analogy is with the literature on targeted employment subsidies 
which has emphasised that subsidies tend to improve some individuals' 
employment prospects at the expenses of others, the latter suffering from 
what are known as "displacement" effects.)
Experimental evidence on the effects of unemployment compensation is 
scarce. Where it exists, it might seem to offer a solution to many of the 
problems of both aggregate time-series and micro data which we have 
described. However, experimental data have problems of their own and one 
which particularly concerns us here is that while they may be designed to 
shed light on one labour market transition, a permanent programme along the 
lines of the experiment may have an impact on others as well. For example, 
a policy experiment might alter the incentive to return to work and be 
applied only to the currently unemployed at a certain date. Such an 
experiment would have no effect on inflows to unemployment but if the 
policy was established• as a permanent programme, the incentive to enter 
unemployment could be altered.
Finally, in reporting the empirical evidence we restrict ourselves to 




























































































or aggregate data) the effect of unemployment compensation on one or more 
of the transitions between labour market states we have described. This 
means that we do not survey evidence on the effects of benefits in wage 
equations of structural models of the aggregate labour market or their 
impact in reduced form models of aggregate unemployment that lack an 
explicit underlying structure.
ii) Exit from unemployment and levels of unemployment compensation
The aspect of unemployment compensation that has received most 
attention is the impact of benefit levels on the transitions out of 
unemployment. One reason for the foci s on outflows from unemployment may 
be their relative importance in explaining changes in overall unemployment 
levels. Rises in unemployment in Europe have been associated particularly 
with falls in outflows and lengthening durations of unemployment (Burda, 
1988) . What may be an extreme example is provided by the UK where almost 
all changes in unemployment in the years 1967-1983 can be attributed to 
changes in outflows, a period when unemployment varied between under 3 per 
cent to nearly 16 per cent (Pissarides, 1986). Sider (1985) shows that 
over a similar period, 1968-82, changes in inflows in the US did play a 
more important .role in determining the overall level of unemployment and 
this may be a reason why North American research on inflows is more 
developed than in Europe. Nevertheless, Sider concludes that the effect of 
changes in outflows has dominated that of inflows (see Darby et al, 1986, 
for a dissenting view).
Several observers have concluded that firm evidence exists concerning 
the effect of variations in levels of unemployment compensation on the 
outflow from unemployment. Reviewing micro-data studies in the US, 
Danziger et al. (1981) find a positive relationship between unemployment 
insurance and duration of unemployment which "appears robust" (p.992). In 
the UK, considerable attention has been paid to the conclusion reached by 
Lancaster and Nickell (1980) based on their separate work - also using 





























































































A number of points about these conclusions can be made. Firstly, the 
estimated effects reported in these studies are rather modest. Danziger et 
al. point to the work of Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) as the study they 
consider to be the most reliable; this indicates that a rise in the 
replacement ratio of 10 per cent would increase the duration of 
unemployment by about one week. Lancaster and Nickell concluded that the 
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefits was about 0.6. 
These estimates suggest that only quite large cuts in benefits could raise 
outflows sufficiently to reduce unemployment by a substantial amount.
Secondly, the micro-data results from the US and the UK are not as 
robust as has been claimed, an aspect which has been emphasised by us 
elsewhere (Atkinson et al. , 1984, Atkinson and Micklewright, 1985). One 
aspect that we highlighted was the sensitivity of results to assumptions 
made about the benefit system and this echoes our concern expressed earlier 
in this paper about the treatment of unemployment compensation in 
theoretical models. In our own analysis of UK unemployment duration, we 
found that the earlier results of Lancaster and Nickell could be reproduced 
if the benefit variable were calculated hypothetically for each person 
under the assumption of complete entitlement and take-up. However, when we 
based our calculations of the benefit variable (and its changes over the 
spell of unemployment) on the amounts reported as being received, its 
effect ceased to be significantly different from zero. In the US, Hills 
(1982) has noted the sensitivity of results in the well known work of 
Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) to the treatment of those unemployed who do not 
file for benefits. Recent research has demonstrated more awareness of 
institutional details of unemployment compensation systems and the actual 
pattern of benefit receipt that they generate, including the variation of 
benefit payments over a spell of unemployment. Coupled with the use of 
data sets which accurately measure from administrative records the precise 
benefit amounts paid out to unemployed people, this has led to more 
reliable estimates of the effects of benefits. An important example from 
the UK is the study by Narendranathan et al. (1985), who using panel data 
supplemented with information from administrative records providing full 
benefit histories found a well-defined but very small benefit elasticity of 
duration (around 0.3). In the US, Moffitt (1985), Meyer (1988) and Katz 




























































































data. Moffitt reports a benefit elasticity of about 0.4.
The third point which needs to be emphasised is that evidence of 
benefit effects on unemployment duration from the US and from Britain 
should not be taken as necesarily representative of those in other 
countries. Unemployment compensation systems and other labour market 
institutions may differ in a way that means a change in the level of 
benefits may not have the same effect across countries. For example, we 
would expect benefit increases to have the least effect in countries where 
the administration of the unemployment compensation, including the 
monitoring of job search, is very tight.
Evidence from the rest of the OECD on benefit effects is less 
voluminous, although appears to be increasing quite rapidly. In Australia 
(one of the very few OECD countries with UA but no UI) , Trivedi and 
Kapuscinski (1985) report from their time-series work on outflows, 
"consistent and robust evidence" (p.181) of the effect of benefits on the 
probability of continuing in unemployment, but it should be noted that the 
effect they detect is again rather slight, a A$10 a week increase in 
unemployment benefit being estimated to increase spell lengths by 1.5 to 3 
weeks. On the other hand, Florens et al. (1988) find benefit effects with 
a large French microdata set based on administrative records which "remain 
ambiguous and very sensitive to the model used as well as to the data which 
are considered" (p.47). Analysing unemployment spells recorded in the West 
German Social Economic Panel, Wurzel (1988) finds a negative but 
insignificant effect of benefits on unemployment duration. Using the same 
source, Hujer and Schneider (1989) do not enter the level of benefits but 
find that the switch from UI to UA appears to result in a significant fall 
in the exit probability, despite this switch resulting in a lower benefit 
level. Ham and Rea (1987) find no significant benefit level effect with 
Canadian microdata but note that the lack of geographical variation in 
benefit rules, in marked contrast to the US, may make benefit effects 
difficult to identify in a country such as Canada where benefits are a 
constant fraction of insurable earnings.
The fourth point we would like to make about the estimated effect of 




























































































concerns the variation of the impact with the length of time unemployed and 
with personal characteristics, notably age. As far as the former is 
concerned, although there has been extensive discussion of duration 
dependence as such, there has been less attention paid to how the 
derivative of the transition probability with respect to unemployment 
benefits may change over time. One of the few authors to have addressed 
this question is Nickell (1979 and 1979a) in his study of unemployment 
duration in Britain. He allowed the coefficient on the replacement rate 
variable to vary with duration, and with his preferred version of the 
estimated equation he finds that after 20 weeks current benefits had no 
significant effect on the probability to return to work. With a more 
detailed UK data set, Narendranathan et al. (1985) find a significant 
benefit effect persisting after 6 months only for teenagers. This sort of 
evidence has important implications for policy suggesting, in the case of 
the UK, that income support for most of the long-term unemployed may be 
increased to a higher level without concern for incentives. If the 
evidence points the other way, as is suggested for Holland by van den Berg 
(1989) using a non-stationary structural model, the implications will of 
course be different (van den Berg finds a markedly higher benefit effect 
after 2 years).
iii)Outflows from unemployment to different labour market states
The bulk of work on the outflow from unemployment has modelled the 
total outflow to other labour market states and not the flow which may be 
of most interest to policy makers - that from unemployment to employment 
(this comment for example applies to all the UK studies referred to above). 
Thus even if we were to have a robust estimate of the effect of benefits on 
the total outflow probability for a given country we might well not be able 
to tell by how much a cut in benefits would actually raise employment as 
opposed to increasing withdrawals from the labour force and increasing the 
rate of entry into government training schemes. The importance of 
distinguishing the exit state from unemployment is demonstated by the work 
of Narandranathan and Stewart (1989). Using UK microdata, they find that a 
single-risk model, which does not distinguish the different transitions out 
of unemployment understates by about a quarter the effect of unemployment 




























































































In theory one might expect unemployment benefit to deter all forms of 
exit. The relevant ratio is now, not that between benefit and income in 
employment, but that between benefit and income in training or out of the 
labour force. If for example the benefit level falls relative to student 
grants, this may make full-time education more attractive. The same may 
apply if the benefit falls relative to payments made to trainees on 
government schemes. In the UK, for example, the Government in announcing a 
new training programme for the long-term unemployed, stated that a premium 
of at least £10 would be paid over weekly unemployment benefit in order to 
provide an incentive to join the scheme (Department of Employment, 1988a). 
On the other hand, comparatively little is known about the determinants of 
the transition from unemployment to training and the impact of such a 
premium. The study from Sweden by Edin (1989) is unusual in that it models 
the separate flows from unemployment to public labour programmes as well as 
to employment and to inactivity. Problems with missing data prevent the 
use of information on unemployment compensation, but his results with 
respect to other variables suggest that it is important to distinguish 
different destinations when examining the probability of exit from 
unemployment.
As far as the transition to inactivity is concerned, rather more is 
known, particularly in the US, where a number of authors have attempted to 
distinguish the effect of unemployment compensation on transitions to 
inactivity from that on transitions to employment. In the US, Clark and 
Summers (1982) found the effect on both transitions to be insignificant. 
In contrast, Barron and Mellow (1981) found that the probability of leaving 
unemployment for both employment and for inactivity was lower for UI 
recipients.
Even within the employment destination it is important, as we have 
argued, to distinguish between different types of job. One distinction is 
that of regular versus marginal jobs. In theory the existence of 
unemployment insurance makes covered employment more attractive and may 
lead to a decline in the reservation wage. Workers in regular jobs have to 
contribute to unemployment insurance, but the actuarial return to these 
contributions may well exceed this cost (since the employer bears his 




























































































incentive for workers to enter the regular employment and reduce the 
importance of the black economy.
The influence of unemployment compensation on whether the unemployed 
exit to regular or marginal employment is clearly hard to detect 
empirically, principally because of problems in defining in any given data 
set which post-unemployment jobs are "regular" and which are "marginal". 
One possibility might be to label all jobs held for less than a certain 
period as marginal but this would only pick-up one dimension of our 
definition and would moreover wrongly classify some jobs which were ex-ante 
regular.
A second classification of the outflows from unemployment to employment 
which we made in Section 1 was to distinguish unemployment ending in recall 
to the previous employer from that ending through entry to a new j ob. Katz 
and Meyer (1988) in the US and Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen (1989) in 
Denmark both attempt to isolate the separate effect of unemployment 
compensation on recall and new job exit probabilities using individual 
microdata. The former find the level of UI amongst claimants in Missouri 
to have no significant effect in a single-risk model but to have a 
significantly negative effect on the probability of finding a new job when 
allowance is made for the distinction between new job and recall. The 
authors do, however, counsel some caution when interpreting their results, 
pointing to the peculiar nature of the variation in the UI payments in 
their sample and to the fact that they find that UI has a significantly 
positive impact on the recall probability. Theory would suggest no 
(supply-side) impact at all if those persons who are recalled do not 
conduct job search. An insignificant effect of the replacement rate on the 
probability of leaving temporary layoff unemployment is indeed found by 
Topel (1983) using CPS data. Jensen and Westergard-Nielsen's results for 
Denmark display considerable variety, their model being estimated 
separately for men and women and for four different age groups. Although 
the replacement rate frequently has quite different effects on the 





























































































iv) Entry into unemployment
Unemployment compensation may affect entry into unemployment by a 
variety of means; for the moment we concentrate on the effects of the level 
of benefit and method of financing. The latter works via the demand side 
of the labour market while the former works through quit behaviour on the 
supply side. An upper bound on the effect via quits is given by the 
proportion of entrants to unemployment who leave their jobs voluntarily. 
Evidence suggests that in the the UK rather more persons quit than in the 
US but in neither country do such people form the majority of the 
unemployed (Johnson and Layard, 1986).
Outside the US, empirical evidence on the quantitative significance of 
the effect of unemployment compensation levels on the entry to unemployment 
is rather limited. Studies using time-series data on flows in the UK by 
Nickell (1982) and by Trivedi and Kapuscinski (1985) in Australia give 
qualitatively similar results. Both find significant effects of benefit 
levels on the outflows from unemployment but neither finds any strong 
evidence that benefits have much effect on inflows. Similarly, using the 
same micro-data as described earlier when considering inflows, Stern (1986) 
detects no effect of benefits on the probability that males in the UK 
re-enter unemployment within a given period of an earlier spell. These 
sorts of results where an analyst uses the same data-set to look at both 
inflows and outflows are clearly very useful given the difficulties of 
comparing different studies. All three studies just mentioned appear to 
suggest that benefits affect inflows into unemployment less than outflows.
At the same time, we need to recognise again that it is typically the 
total inflows from all labour market states that are being modelled, and 
not specifically the flow from employment to unemployment. The US 
literature on inflows, to which we have not yet referred, provides several 
examples of studies where the source of inflow has been distinguished, and 
gives a rather different picture of the effect of unemployment 
compensation. Hamermesh (1979) examines evidence for a sample of married 
women in the US and argues that there is a significant entitlement effect 
of UI encouraging entry into the labour force, although Clark and Summers 




























































































force to unemployment is increased by UI at the expense of the transition 
from that state into employment.
In later work, Clark and Summers (1982) found significant positive 
effects of UI on transitions from employment and inactivity to unemployment 
and negative effects on transitions from employment to inactivity. The 
bulk of the effect found by Clark and Summers arose on account of the 
sub-sample who had entered unemployment through layoff, and considerable 
attention has been paid in the US to the incentives provided to employers 
and employees to negotiate contracts under which fluctuations in demand 
lead to unemployment (the theoretical literature was reviewed in section 
2). Feldstein (1978) examines the probability that a person is on layoff 
unemployment in the US and concludes that around half of this unemployment 
is due to unemployment benefit. More recently, the different effects of 
unemployment compensation on temporary layoffs, permanent separations and 
quits has been studied in several papers by Topel (1983, 1984, 1985). In 
the last of these he uses a sample of over 75,000 observations on prime-age 
males pooled from five years of the CPS (1977-81) to consider the effect of 
both benefit levels and incomplete experience rating on transitions. The 
level of imputed UI is found to have no significant effect on quits (a 
result also reported by Marston, 1980), which Topel notes as probably 
reflecting the fact that benefit is withheld from most voluntary quitters 
in the US (see below). Controlling for personal characteristics, an 
individual's potential UI (as calculated by Topel) also appears to have 
little effect on the permanent layoff probability but there is a strongly 
significant effect on the probability of temporary layoff. Introducing a 
variable measuring the degree of government subsidy to layoffs (brought 
about by incomplete experience rating) in each individual's state, much of 
the effect of potential UI drops away but the subsidy measure is very 
important. Topel concludes that if the subsidy to layoff were to be 
eliminated through improved experience-rating, the unemployment rate in his 
sample would fall by a full one per cent point, this representing about a 
quarter of all the unemployment spells in the data.
The popular discussion of unemployment compensation and inflow of 
unemployment often supposes that workers find it financially attractive to 




























































































holiday" of planned and certain duration. The US results indicate that UI 
may indeed have important effects on inflows but that the impact may be 
from the demand side and not the supply side of the market. As is observed 
by Burtless (1987), it is noteworthy that layoff unemployment is much more 
important in the US, where the implicit subsidy to temporary layoff 
unemployment is in fact less than in other OECD countries, where (apart 
from Sweden) there is little or no experience-rating of UI. According to 
Fitzroy and Hart (1985) this cannot be attributed to differences in labour 
law or institutions. Whatever the reason for the lower amount of temporary 
layoff unemployment in Europe, it may be that the kinds of concern voiced 
by Feldstein and Topel about the adverse effects of UI may be of lesser 
significance in other countries.
v) Other parameters of unemployment compensation systems
To this point, when looking at the supply-side of the market, we have 
only considered the effect of variation in levels of unemployment 
compensation. However, there is much more to the operation of a benefit 
system than the level of benefit, as we have emphasised. Governments may 
be able to manipulate the flows to and from unemployment by changing other 
parameters of the system.
The duration of benefits is one such parameter. Aggregate time-series 
data have been used by Bjorklund (1978) to try and assess the extensions of 
UI duration in Sweden in 1968 and 1974. No effect could be detected on the 
quarterly outflow rate from unemployment. Microdata have been used in the 
US by, amongst others, Katz and Meyer (1988a) who note a sharp rise in the 
outflow rate from unemployment spells of UI recipients recorded in the 
Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics data, about the time of UI 
exhaustion, this not occuring for non-recipients. Their econometric 
estimates, obtained with a sample of CWBH data suggest that an increase in 
potential UI duration of 1 week increases the mean length of time 
unemployed by up to 0.2 weeks. (A rather larger effect is found in Canada 
by Ham and Rea, 1987). Notably, Katz and Meyer conclude that changes in UI 
duration have greater efects than changes in UI levels, and their 
simulations show a given UI expenditure cut achieved via reducing the 




























































































benefit levels. Interestingly, the results in Katz and Meyer (1988) and 
Ham and Rea (1987) suggest a similar effect of benefit period entitlement 
on both recall and new job probabilities. This is perhaps suprising since 
one would expect the mechanisms at work to be rather different.
The type of income support for the unemployed differs significantly 
between the US and Europe, the latter having more extensive assistance 
programmes for those exhausting insurance entitlement, as we noted in 
Section 2. This should make us wary when interpreting attempts to 
extrapolate findings of North American studies concerning the effect of the 
duration of benefit to Europe. Burtless (1987, p. 148) uses the results of 
Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) which imply a slightly smaller UI duration 
effect than that estimated by Katz and Meyer, to predict that the effect in 
Europe of the substantially longer UI entitlement in leading to longer 
duration of unemployment would be only 2£-4 weeks in Britain and West 
Germany, 3£-5 in Sweden and 5-7£ in France. These calculations assume that 
UI recipients in Europe would not take any account of any follow-on UA 
which may be claimed on the expiry of insurance benefits, hence increasing 
duration further. At the same time, it would clearly be wrong to assume 
that UA and UI provide such similar compensation that the effect of 
assistance follow-on is to indefinitely extend UI entitlement de facto. We 
have seen that in the case of two European countries with both assistance 
and insurance benefits - the UK and West Germany - the switch from UI to 
UA produces a significant reduction in total income in many cases. The 
distinction between insurance and assistance is an important one.
We have emphasised at various times the importance of recognising any 
effects on behaviour of the administration of unemployment compensation. 
Besides passing a contribution or an income test, a person claiming 
unemployment compensation has typically to satisfy various conditions 
concerning the circumstances of entry to unemployment and to search for new 
work. Voluntary quitting without good cause, failure to be available for 
work and the refusal of suitable job offers may all lead to a suspension or 
reduction of benefit payments or even complete disqualification. A 
tightening of administration of benefits may be an easier step than cutting 
their level for policy makers wishing to increase incentives. Selective 




























































































acceptable than across the board cuts in compensation affecting all the 
unemployed (Atkinson, 1988).
We have noted that a varying degree of severity of administration may 
result in different benefit level (or duration) elasticities across 
countries. Changes in administration over time may of course also affect 
transitions to and from unemployment with benefit levels held constant. It 
is useful to distinguish the treatment of an initial claim for benefit, 
which might be expected to affect especially the inflows to unemployment, 
and the ongoing monitoring of the claimant which will influence the outflow 
as well. As far as the latter is concerned, Burtless has argued that 
"compared with government employment services in Europe, the U.S. 
Employment Service is relatively ineffective in aiding and monitoring the 
search for jobs" (1987, p. 149). He singles out Sweden as an exemplum, 
saying that the compulsory notification of vacancies makes it quite simple 
for the state employment service to match job slots to the unemployed and 
thus to test availability for work. This will of course depend on the 
level of vacancies and the staffing levels in employment service offices. 
(In Section 2 we described the theoretical treatment of such a scheme by 
Pissarides, 1979).
Legislation concerning initial claims to UI toughened in much of the US 
during the late 1970s. Solon (1984) reports that by January 1983, 
fourty-four states disqualified those who quit voluntaily "without just 
cause" for the full period of their claim. That this legislation does not 
go unused is illustrated by the fact that in 1974, nearly 18 per cent of 
all UI claims ruled eligible on contribution grounds in California were 
disallowed because of voluntary quitting (Vickery, 1979). Pooling 
state-level data for 1978-80, Solon fails to find any effect on quit rates 
in manufacturing of changes in UI laws relating to the treatment of quits. 
Of course, benefit authorities may alter the severity with which they 
administer claims without any change in the law.
Our own analysis of administrative data in Britain shows that while 5 
per cent of the male unemployed stock in 1974 had been disqualified from UI 
under voluntary quitting or industrial misconduct clauses, this proportion 




























































































period, the law relating to quitting and misconduct and the period of 
disqualification were unchanged (since 1985 the period of disqualification 
has been extended from 6 to 26 weeks). (The number of unemployed men rose 
several fold over the period, making the decline in absolute numbers 
disqualified less dramatic). Evidence of this type led Layard (1986) to 
argue that the administration of unemployment compensation in the UK had 
become much less severe and to suggest this as a contributory factor in the 
rise in unemployment since the late 1960s. (He also cited the separation 
in the 1970s of benefit payment offices from the employment service and the 
ending in the 1980s of the requirement of the unemployed to register with 
the latter). However, time-series on disqualifications are hard to 
interpret, a fall being entirely consistent with a decreased tendency to 
"malinger" as well as the alternative of a more relaxed administration. 
More seriously, there is the question of the direction of causation; 
increased leniency, particularly in the dealing with ongoing claims, could 
be a response to rising unemployment, rather than a cause of it. In other 
parts of unemployment compensation systems this reaction may actually be 
in-built, as is the case in the US where federal funding of an extended 
duration of UI benefit is triggered if the state unemployment rate exceeds 
a certain figure (a similar mechanism applies in Canada).
We need also to distinguish the changes in the number of actual 
disqualifications from changes in a credible threat of it occuring. This 
has certainly increased in recent years in the UK where a number of steps 
have been taken to tighten monitoring of benefit claims and job search 
(Atkinson and Micklewright, 1989). In France too, there has been increased 
surveillance of the long-term unemployed (OECD, 1987, p.131). Concrete 
evidence of the effect on transitions out of unemployment is provided for 
the UK by Royston (1983, 1984) who reports the results of an experiment in 
1980 in which half of a sample of UI recipients who had been claiming for 
three months were subjected to review, including an interview. Expected 
post-review spell duration of the experimental group was reduced by an 
average of some 3.9 weeks compared to the control group.
In considering the implications of this kind of policy, the distinction 
between different types of exit is again important. The effect of claim 




























































































unemployment but not necessarily into employment. While some claimants may 
be stirred into increasing their search activity and hence their chances of 
re-employment, others may simply drop out of the labour force. The effect 
on transitions to employment may in particular be towards marginal jobs, 
these being the jobs where vacancies are typically more plentiful. For 
example, in April 1989 the Australian government announced that benefit 
claimants would be required to seek any casual or temporary work within 
their capacity. (Previously, a claimant could restrict his search to jobs 
within his usual occupation for 6 weeks). Similarly, the effect of 
regulations on quitting on inflows may be to reduce transitions into 
registered unemployment but some persons may still quit into unemployment 
more widely defined.
If the administration of benefit could be called the "stick" approach 
to encouraging transitions out of unemployment then the offering to the 
unemployed of a financial bonus on securing employment represents the 
"carrot". In Australia, this policy is now in place for the long-term 
unemployed, who since February 1989 have received A$100 on securing a job. 
Experimental evidence of the effect of re-employment bonuses comes from the 
US where there have been trials in several states. The Illinois experiment 
appears to have had substantial effects, the $500 bonus paid to new 
claimants obtaining a job within 11 weeks (and holding it for 4 months) 
having led to an average one week reduction in duration for the 
experimental group (the average including those who refused to participate 
and those who did not claim or qualify for the bonus) and a net saving in 
UI expenditure (Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987). Meyer (1988) estimates the 
probability of re-employment for the control group to have been some 14 per 
cent higher during the qualifying 11 week period.
Re-employment bonuses are obviously intended to influence the outflow 
from unemployment to employment but their affect may be more widespread. 
Some of these effects are discussed by Meyer (1988) who considers the 
problems with a permanent bonus and concludes that the experiments did not 
show the desirability of a permanent programme. In a scheme, such as that 
in Illinois, where qualification for the bonus was immediate on entry to 
unemployment, the inflow to unemployment could be expected to increase. 




























































































another would have an incentive to briefly register as unemployed in 
between jobs. Secondly, a bonus programme that pays people returning to 
their last employer would provide a strong encouragement to temporary 
layoffs. Where eligibility for a re-employment bonus is dependent on 
having been unemployed for a certain length of time, then this could be 
expected to have a negative effect on the re-employment probability during 
the qualifying period. In the case of the Australian programme where the 
bonus is modest and the qualifying period long, this effect may be rather 
slight. In the New Jersey experiment where the bonus was in excess of 
$1,500 and the qualifying period only seven weeks, a very strong 
disincentive could be expected.
vi) Participation of partners of the unemployed
The final effect of unemployment compensation which we review is that 
on the employment of the family of a person claiming benefits. Much has 
been written about the "added worker" effect that unemployment itself may 
have on family labour supply, but very little on the impact of the system 
of unemployment benefit. The effect of the benefit system on the behaviour 
of other family members depends on the design of the unemployment 
compensation scheme. If benefits are paid on a wholly individual basis, 
then there is purely an income effect on the decisions of others. If 
benefit receipt is means-tested on family income, as with UA, there may be 
substitution effects as well, with the net result being a strong 
disincentive effects on the labour supply of other family members, with a 
marginal tax rate of 100 per cent operating over a range of earnings. An 
intermediate situation is where part of the unemployment benefit - a 
spouse's addition - is conditional on the employment status of the spouse. 
In this latter situation, there is a notch in the budget constraint faced 
by the wife, and once this is passed the loss of benefit operates like a 
fixed cost of working.
Concern has been expressed about this disincentive aspect on account of 
the observed lower labour force participation of the wives of the 
unemployed. In the UK it has been noted that the participation rates of 
the wives of unemployed men are substantially lower than those of other 




























































































Kell (1987) have pointed to the higher participation of wives where the 
husband is in receipt of unemployment insurance (where there is only the 
notch) than for those receiving the means-tested benefit (with 100 per cent 
marginal tax rate). In the United States, couples where the husband was 
unemployed (in March 1980) had a similar participation rate for the wife to 
that where the husband was employed, but the wives' unemployment rate was 
nearly four times as high (OECD, 1982, Table 9). In Canada, Ridgeway (1987) 
noted that the entry of married women into the labour force might have been 
expected to reduce the proportion of families with unemployment who had no 
one else in employment, whereas in fact this proportion remained virtually 
stable between 1975 and 1986.
There are of course a number of possible explanations for these 
patterns, including the fact that spouses face similar labour market 
conditions. Using different data sets for the UK, Garcia (1985, 1989) and 
Kell and Wright (1988) attempt to isolate the disincentive effect by 
estimating microeconometric models of labour supply for wives of unemployed 
men, taking into account the effect of family means-testing on the budget 
constraint. Garcia concludes that a reform which extended UI to unemployed 
men in receipt of means-tested UA would raise the overall participation 
rate of the wiyes in his sample of male unemployed by nearly 8 per cent 
points (1989, p.179). This represents a substantial impact, although 
Garcia notes that it implies that the disincentive effect of means-testing 
accounts for only a quarter of the shortfall in the participation rate of 
such women compared to that for all married women.
The results from the static models of Garcia and of Kell and Wright are 
important contributions in an area where little is known. At the same 
time, we need to recognise that the disincentive posed for a wife by her 
husband's UA receipt is not permanent, lasting only as long as he stays 
unemployed and continues to receive assistance. In choosing her labour 
supply, a married women may need to form an expectation as to how long her 
husband is likely to remain unemployed; if the labour market is slack she 
may not be able to easily re-enter employment at a later date if she quits 
work. The disincentive effect on wives' work may therefore vary with the 
state of the labour market and, to the extent that duration dependence in 




























































































been unemployed (Moylan el al, 1984, provide some descriptive evidence of 





























































































Our aim in this paper has been to bring out the significance in the 
analysis of unemployment compensation of (a) distinguishing different 
labour market states and (b) treating the institutional features of 
different forms of benefit. The reasons why we believe them to be 
important in theoretical analysis have been summarised at the end of 
Section 2, where we concluded that, in general, too little attention had 
been paid to these aspects. Here we concentrate primarily on the empirical 
findings.
We began the paper with the assertion that we have to look beyond a 
simple employment/unemployment trade-cff and that we need to consider 
dimensions of unemployment compensation other than the level of benefit 
payments. The importance of this wider view depends on how far transitions 
other than those between employment and unemployment are affected by 
benefits and on how far parameters other than benefit amounts influence 
transition probabilities in the labour market. In the latter case, we have 
drawn attention to the duration and time structure of unemployment 
insurance, to the administration of unemployment compensation, to the 
disqualification of the unemployed from benefit, to bonus payments for 
re-employment, and to the implications for labour supply decisions of the 
family means-test for unemployment assistance. Regarding the former, the 
findings on different transitions suggest that there are some grounds for 
believing that it is necessary to distinguish the different labour market 
states to which people move after they have been unemployed and the 
different states from which they enter unemployment. The evidence is 
however limited and, despite the large literature, we have found relatively 
little evidence concerning several potentially important effects of 
unemployment compensation on labour market transitions.
It should moreover be emphasised that the evidence we have assembled is 
drawn from a variety of OECD countries, with the United States numerically 
the best represented, and that it may be dangerous to extrapolate the 
findings from one country to another. To take a recent example, Katz and 
Meyer (1988a), after studying the impact of potential duration of 




























































































draw conclusions about the difference in unemployment rates between the US 
and Europe. This fails to take account of the many differences between 
unemployment compensation systems on different sides of the Atlantic, to 
say nothing of the variation within Europe. We have for example emphasised 
the distinction between unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, 
the differences in administration of benefit conditions, the relation with 
the public employment service, and other factors. In arguing for a richer 
view of both the labour market and of unemployment compensation, we have 
also been arguing for greater care in making international comparisons. 
Empirical evidence has to be sought in the context to which it is to be 
applied.
Unemployment benefit has not had a good press in recent years, with 
stress being placed on its negative effects on employment and labour market 
operation. Our review of the evidence leads us to conclude that there may 
be adverse effects on the incentive for the unemployed to leave 
unemployment but that these may be small and that there is little ground 
for believing that much voluntary quitting is induced by the unemployment 
insurance system (although there may be a significant impact on employer 
behaviour in countries where temporary layoffs are common). Moreover, the 
richer view of the relationship between unemployment compensation and the 
labour market that we have urged in this paper allows us to identify some 
of the ways in which it may have a positive, rather than a negative, 
impact. This applies particularly to unemployment insurance, as opposed to 
unemployment assistance. Unemployment insurance may have positive effects 
in encouraging labour force participation - the effect identified by 
Friedman in his Nobel Lecture - and favouring regular rather than marginal 
employment. Unemployment insurance, without an income test, does not 
involve high marginal tax rates on the earnings of other family members. 
These effects of unemployment compensation on labour market transitions 
should be taken into account in any overall judgment on the role of state 
provision of income maintenance for the unemployed, along with the 
contribution to distributional and stabilisation goals that we have not 
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